US ERA ARCHIVE DOCUMENT

## Economic Impact and Employment Analysis

OAQPS/AEG Approach to Evaluating Economic Impacts of Environmental Regulations

Presentation for Ozone Transport Commission September 28, 2012


## Why Prepare an Economic Impact Analysis (EIA)?

- Legal and Executive Order Requirements
- Statutes:
  - Clean Air Act
  - Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) & Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Act (SBREFA)
  - Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
- Executive Orders (selected):
  - EO 12866 and 13563 Regulatory Planning and Review
  - EO 13211 Statement of Energy Effects
- Distributional Impacts
  - Goes beyond control and compliance costs, i.e., answers the question of who bears the burden of the regulation and how much

#### AEG Economic Impact Modeling Approach for MACT, Residual Risk and NSPSes

- Scope = Partial equilibrium
  - Partial equilibrium analysis of impacts in one market or industry holding all other impacts constant
- Length of run = intermediate run (usually 3-5 years from rule promulgation)
- Comparative static vs. dynamic
- Market Structure, e.g., perfect competition
- Important Note: AEG uses compliance costs as an input to its econ. impact modeling for these standards
  - Compliance costs prepared by SPPD (a sister division in OAQPS)


#### Market Demand And Supply




**Demand:** P increases Q<sub>d</sub> decreases

**Supply:** P increases Q<sub>s</sub> increases


## Full-Cost Absorption: No Supply Response



## Full-Cost Absorption: With Supply Response



## Partial Equilibrium Model: with Supply and Demand Response



### AEG Economic Impact Approach for NAAQS RIAs

- With NAAQS analyses, multiple industries are often impacted, unlike other rules OAQPS issues
- Analysis depends upon the scope of the projected nonattainment (no. of counties, amount of exceedance) and the magnitude of the annualized costs.
  - Limited nonattainment costs allocated by NAICS codes, limited economic impact analyses
  - Extensive nonattainment CGE modeling preferred
    - OAQPS has EMPAX as a CGE model; working on updates and revisions to make it useful for NAAQS analyses
- Economic impact modeling does not include extrapolated costs
  - Extrapolated costs not distributed by industry; cannot include in economic impact modeling

## RFA-SBREFA, UMRA, and Statement of Energy Effects

- RFA/SBREFA Requires initial scoping analysis using a variety of financial indicators such as:
  - Annual Cost-to-sales ratios
    - Initial scoping analysis can provide some indication of potential economic impacts to affected firms; not a substitute for an full EIA
    - Applied often for small entity impact analysis; if impacts of a proposed rule are significant and substantial enough; then EPA must convene a SBREFA Panel
- UMRA compare cost of the regulation to budget or gross receipts of the governmental entity.
- Statement of Energy Effects estimate impacts on energy prices, output, transmission, and distribution

#### **Employment Analysis**

- EPA/OAQPS estimates employment impacts for regulations, particularly for economically significant ones
- EPA produces employment impacts directly related to compliance requirements:
  - Full-time equivalents (FTEs) associated with new control equipment (MATS)
    - · Analysis is found in RIA for final rule
  - FTEs associated with monitoring, testing, and recordkeeping requirements
    - RICE rules, analysis in RIA for proposed reconsideration rules, and other rules

#### Employment Analysis (cont.)

- EPA also estimates impacts to the regulated industry through Morgenstern,
  Pizer, Shih approach (or MPS approach)
- Prepared with the support of RFF, econometric study based on 1979–1991 data for four industries (pulp and paper, plastics, petroleum, and steel).
  Paper became a peer-reviewed journal article (2002).
- The "Demand Effect" -- higher production costs raise market prices, reducing consumption (and production), thereby reducing demand for labor within the regulated industry
- The "Cost Effect" -- As production costs increase, plants use more of all inputs, including labor, to maintain a given level of output.
- The "Factor-Shift Effect" -- Regulated firms' production technologies may be more or less labor intensive after complying with a regulation (i.e., more/less labor is required per dollar of output)
- Sum of these effects = net employment impact to a regulated industry
  - Used to analyze impacts for MATS, ICI boiler standards
  - While there are limitations from age of data, still a good approach for estimating such impacts where appropriate

#### Conclusions

- Economic Impact and Employment Analyses can provide valuable information to regulatory decision-makers.
- For More Information, please visit:
- EPA Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analysis
  - Prepared by EPA's NCEE; available at <u>http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/guidelines.</u> <u>html</u>
- ECAS website on TTN
   http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas I/
  - RIA/EIA Reports
  - OAQPS Economics Resource Manual

#### • APPENDIX

### Economic Welfare Changes




Figure 5-14. Economic Welfare Changes with Regulation: Consumer and Producer Surplus

#### Baseline Scenario

REFIN	ED MOT	OR GASOLINE							
		Market Data	BASE						
		Price (\$/barrel)	\$90.00						
		Output (10 <sup>6</sup> barrels/yr)	3,134						
						cos	ΓS		
CO_ID	FAC_ID	SUPPLIER NAME	EMP	OUTPUT	REV	PROD	REG	PROFIT	CLOSE
1	1	TexacoBakersfield, CA	120	150	\$13,500	\$13,163	\$0	\$338	N
1	2	TexacoLos Angeles, CA	200	250	\$22,500	\$21,938	\$0	\$563	Ν
1	3	TexacoPuget Sound, WA	200	250	\$22,500	\$21,938	\$0	\$563	Ν
2	4	ChevronPortland, OR	240	300	\$27,000	\$26,055	\$0	\$945	Ν
2	5	ChevronPhiladelphia, PA	100	125	\$11,250	\$3,729	\$0	\$7,521	N
3	6	Alaskan OilAnchorage, AK	20	25	\$2,250	\$2,183	\$0	\$68	N
4	. 7	Valero RefiningTX	40	50	\$4,500	\$4,365	\$0	\$135	N
		ALL OTHER DOMESTIC	1,260	1,575	\$141,750	\$136,080	\$0	\$5,670	Ν
DOME	STIC TO	ΓAL	2,180	2,725	\$245,250	\$229,449	\$0	\$15,801	0
		FOREIGN IMPORTS		409					
MARK	ET TOTA	L		3,134					

# Full-Cost Absorption – No Supply Response (P, Q Remain Unchanged)

		Market Data	BASE	WREG	Change				
		Price (\$/barrel)	\$90.00	\$90.00	\$0.00				
		Output (10 <sup>6</sup> barrels/yr)	3,134	3,134	0				
						000	TO.		
						COS			
CO_ID	FAC_ID	SUPPLIER NAME	EMP	OUTPUT	REV	PROD	REG	PROFIT	CLOSE
1	1	TexacoBakersfield, CA	120	150	\$4,500	\$4,388	\$12	\$101	Ν
1	2	TexacoLos Angeles, CA	200	250	\$7,500	\$7,313	\$35	\$153	Ν
1	3	TexacoPuget Sound, WA	200	250	\$7,500	\$7,313	\$35	\$153	N
2	4	ChevronPortland, OR	240	300	\$9,000	\$8,685	\$60	\$255	Ν
2	5	ChevronPhiladelphia, PA	100	125	\$3,750	\$3,729	\$21	\$0	Ν
3	6	Alaskan OilAnchorage, AK	20	25	\$750	\$728	\$3	\$20	N
4	7	Rattlesnake RefiningTX	40	50	\$1,500	\$1,455	\$14	\$31	N
		ALL OTHER DOMESTIC	1,260	1,575	\$47,250	\$45,360	\$0	\$1,890	Ν
DOME	STIC TO	ΓAL	2,180	2,725	\$81,750	\$78,969	\$180	\$2,601	0
		FOREIGN IMPORTS		409					
MARKI	MARKET TOTAL			3,134					

# Full Cost Absorption – With Supply Response (Q Decreases, P Unchanged)

REFIN	ED MOTO	OR GASOLINE							
		Market Data	BASE	WREG	Change				
		Price (\$/barrel)	\$90.00	\$90.00	\$0.00				
		Output (10 <sup>6</sup> barrels/yr)	3,134	3,009	-125				
						COS	ΓS		
CO_ID	FAC_ID	SUPPLIER NAME	EMP	OUTPUT	REV	PROD	REG	PROFIT	CLOSE
1	1	TexacoBakersfield, CA	120	150	\$4,500	\$4,388	\$12	\$101	N
1	2	TexacoLos Angeles, CA	200	250	\$7,500	\$7,313	\$35	\$153	N
1	3	TexacoPuget Sound, WA	200	250	\$7,500	\$7,313	\$35	\$153	N
2	4	ChevronPortland, OR	240	300	\$9,000	\$8,685	\$60	\$255	N
2	5	ChevronPhiladelphia, PA	0	0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	Υ
3	6	Alaskan OilAnchorage, AK	20	25	\$750	\$728	\$3	\$20	N
4	7	Rattlesnake RefiningTX	40	50	\$1,500	\$1,455	\$14	\$31	N
		ALL OTHER DOMESTIC	1,260	1,575	\$47,250	\$45,360	\$0	\$1,890	N
DOME	STIC TO	ΓAL	2,080	2,600	\$78,000	\$75,240	\$159	\$2,601	1
		FOREIGN IMPORTS		409					
MARK	ET TOTA	L		3,009					

## Partial Equilibrium Model: with supply and demand response

REFINE	ED MOTO	OR GASOLINE							
		Market Data	BASE	WREG	Change				
		Price (\$/barrel)	\$90.00	\$90.04	\$0.04				
		Output (10 <sup>6</sup> barrels/yr)	3,134	3,130	-4.0				
						cos	ΓS		
CO_ID	FAC_ID	SUPPLIER NAME	EMP	OUTPUT	REV	PROD	REG	PROFIT	CLOSE
1	1	TexacoBakersfield, CA	120	150	\$4,505	\$4,388	\$12	\$106	N
1	2	TexacoLos Angeles, CA	198	248	\$7,449	\$7,254	\$35	\$160	N
1	3	TexacoPuget Sound, WA	198	248	\$7,449	\$7,254	\$35	\$160	N
2	4	ChevronPortland, OR	238	297	\$8,921	\$8,598	\$59	\$263	N
2	5	ChevronPhiladelphia, PA	99	124	\$3,724	\$3,700	\$21	\$4	N
3	6	Alaskan OilAnchorage, AK	20	25	\$751	\$728	\$3	\$20	N
4	7	Rattlesnake RefiningTX	38	48	\$1,442	\$1,397	\$13	\$31	N
		ALL OTHER DOMESTIC	1,263	1,579	\$47,426	\$45,475	\$0	\$1,951	N
DOMES	STIC TO	ΓAL	2,175	2,719	\$81,667	\$78,793	\$178	\$2,696	0
		FOREIGN IMPORTS		411					
MARKE	ET TOTA	L		3,130					

#### Results: Market Level

		Chai	nges
Refined Motor Gasoline	Baseline	Absolute	Percent
Market price (\$/barrel)	\$30.00	\$0.04	0.1%
Market output (10 <sup>6</sup> bpy)	3,134	-4	-0.1%
Domestic production	2,725	<b>–</b> 6	-0.2%
Affected	1,150	-10	-0.9%
Unaffected	1,575	4	0.3%
Imports	409	2	0.5%

## Results: National Level for an Industry

	Baseline	Absolute	Percent
Refineries			
Revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$81,750	<b>–</b> \$83	-0.1%
Total costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$78,971	\$1	0.0%
Control costs	\$0	\$178	NA
Production costs	\$78,971	<b>–</b> \$177	-0.2%
Pre-tax earnings (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$2,779	-\$84	-3.0%
Refineries (#)	32	0	0.0%
Employment (FTEs)	2,180	<b>–</b> 5	-0.2%

## Results: Distribution of Impacts Across an Industry

	Increased	Decreased			
Refineries	Profits	Profits	Closure	Total	
Facilities (#)	25	7	0	32	
Production					
Total (106 bpy)	1,575	1,150	0	2,725	
Average (bpy/facility)	63	164	0	85	
Compliance costs					
Total (\$106/yr)	\$0	\$178	\$0	\$178	
Average (\$/barrel)	\$0.00	\$0.16	\$0.00	\$0.07	
Change in profit (\$106)	\$61	-\$146	\$0	-\$84	

#### Results: Social Costs

Distribution of the Social Costs of the Regulation: 2012				
Change in Consumer Surplus (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	<b>-</b> \$111.8			
Domestic	<b>-</b> \$111.8			
Foreign	\$0			
Change in Producer Surplus (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	<b>-</b> \$67.7			
Domestic producers	-\$84.4			
Affected	-\$145.6			
Unaffected	\$61.1			
Foreign producers	\$16.7			
Social Costs of the Regulation (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$179.5			